Vol. 2, No. 2. Anthropocentrism: the origin of
environmental degradation?
David
Samways
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DOI: 10.3197/jps.2018.2.2.5
Licensing: This article is Open Access (CC BY 4.0).
How to Cite:
Samways, D. 2016. 'Editorial Introduction: Anthropocentrism – the origin of environmental degradation?'. The Journal of Population and Sustainability 2(2): 5–20.
https://doi.org/10.3197/jps.2018.2.2.5
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To
some extent, environmentalism has always been concerned with shifting
orientations, values and attitudes. Whether it is discouraging littering,
encouraging recycling or energy conservation or tackling more fundamental
issues such as consumerism or family size, then a change in values and
attitudes is likely to be involved. It follows that all of the papers in this
issue of the JP&S can be seen as in some sense being concerned with
behaviour change or the consequences of a lack thereof. Three of the papers in
this issue touch on the question of our orientation toward nature and the
wellbeing of other species, and this reflects the wider concerns in the
mainstream environmental literature regarding the ‘anthropocene’ and questions
around the primacy of short-term human interests in contrast with the health
and sustainability of the biosphere. In the latter part of this editorial
introduction I want to take the opportunity to examine a particular attitudinal
and value orientation which is somewhat pertinent to these papers (and in
particular to the IPAT identity), and which from the beginning of the modern
environmental movement has been a source of great concern: anthropocentrism or
human-centredness.
I
begin with a brief overview of the contributions to this issue. Our first
paper, Ugo Bardi’s A Seneca Collapse for the
World’s Human Population?, examines the concept of the ‘Seneca
Effect’ (as developed in his 2017 book of the same name), in respect of human
numbers. A Seneca Collapse is typified by a slow growth of one or more of the
elements of a system leading to a rapid collapse. Starting with well-documented
accounts of collapses in animal populations, Bardi shows how, due to a number
of factors, animal populations can follow a typical Seneca curve. Applying the
same analysis to historical data relating to human population declines driven
by food supply collapse, migration, disease, and active lowering of birthrates
– all attended by overdetermining sociological and political factors -, Bardi
shows how similar Seneca Collapses can be observed in human numbers. Bardi
concludes that in broad terms the global human population is subject to the
same constraints as non-human populations i.e. overshoot of the food-supply,
predation (by disease organisms in the human case), and lowering of the birth
rate. It is possible that global population could rapidly collapse due to
predation by a disease organism, but Bardi thinks this much less likely than
overshoot caused by the inability of the global economic system to deliver food
worldwide. The attendant misery of this scenario is extremely objectionable,
and Bardi speculates that it would be centuries before the system would
recover. Finally, the most desirable possibility of a population collapse is
one under our own control. Bardi is cautiously optimistic that economic,
technical and social factors may lead to an active choice to reduce human
numbers before disease and overshoot impose a tragic and dreadful collapse upon
us.
Doug
Booth’s paper Postmaterial Experience:
Economics, Population, and Environmental Sustainablity considers the environmental potential of
the emerging ‘postmaterial’ culture in mature economies. Booth argues that a
mostly young, urban demographic, raised in an era of prosperity, experiencing
little or no material hardship and engaged in a new, and often creative,
service economy has great potential for environmental sustainability. This demographic
displays reduced interest in material possessions and an emphasis on consuming
individual and shared experiences such as concerts, theatre, travel, extreme
sports etc. Usually living and working in the regenerated commercial centres of
cities, they are typically more energy efficient and have a greatly reduced
reliance on the private car.
Postmaterialism
is also positively correlated with concern about the environment. Booth argues
that an expansion in postmaterialism globally could have a direct positive
effect on environmental sustainability, especially if the environmental values
with which it is often associated have an impact on government policies. Booth
speculates that postmaterialism might also foster a reduction in human
fertility over and above that experienced with conventional ‘demographic
transition’. He observes that postmaterial values and reduced fertility are
correlated but that correlation is not cause, and whether postmaterial values
will lead to a reduction in the desire to have children is a question for
future research.
Bill
Ryerson’s paper, The Hidden Gem of the Cairo
Consensus, looks at the UN’s 1994 Programme of Action of the
International Conference on Population and Development. He argues that while
the document it produced (known as the Cairo Consensus) was both
anthropocentric and failed to hold the goal of lowering population growth at
the same status as reproductive health and rights, the encouragement to use
entertainment media as a means to help achieve gender equality has been a
powerful tactic.
Ryerson
shows how through the use of soap operas and other dramatic formats broadcast
on both television and radio, the Population Media Centre (PMC), of which
Ryerson is the President, has successfully and effectively engaged and
challenged social norms and attitudes which underpin the social status of
women, attitudes toward contraception and norms around family size. All of
these factors are significant drivers in population growth in developing
countries, and Ryerson demonstrates how, through a variety of dramatic devices
underpinned by sound psychological and psychosocial theory, the audience is
taken on a journey which challenges established practices and attitudes, whilst
also showing the personal benefits for them and their families of family
planning and fewer children.
This
issue also carries a review by Paul Ehrlich of Tobias and Gray’s Anthrozoology. As an addendum to Ehrlich’s review we
have a previously unpublished paper by John P. Holdren on the history of IPAT.
Those readers familiar with the IPAT equation (impact=population x affluence x
technology) will be aware that the identity was first developed by Ehrlich and
Holdren in the early 70s, and the paper published here leads us through the
development of the equation and defends it against later critiques and
misinterpretations. The first publication of the IPAT equation, along with a
response from Commoner took place in the Bulletin Of The Atomic
Scientists in
1972. Holdren argues that his and Ehrlich’s position has since been caricatured
as asserting population growth as the only important factor. He goes on to show
that, in all of the various iterations of their thesis, their emphasis has been
on the interconnectedness of population, affluence, technology, and various
socioeconomic factors in the environmental impact of humankind.
The 1960s
and early 1970s were the crucible of the modern environmental movement. The
Ehrlich, Holdren and Commoner debate (1972) exemplifies the enormous appetite
for attempting to understand the ‘origin’ and driving forces of environmental
problems. The exchange centred around Commoner’s claim that population increase
and growing affluence was largely irrelevant to the massive growth of
pollution. The actual origin of ecological problems, he argued, was the
adoption of inappropriate and destructive technologies in the post war period,
and that the solution lay in switching to environmentally friendly production.
Ehrlich and Holdren countered that an analysis that focused on technology alone
was totally inadequate and misleading, but more importantly did not address
fundamental ecological issues like species extinction. They began their
critique by pointing out that well before the advent of modern technology
people had had a significant impact on the environment.
…
serious ecological harm has accompanied man’s activities ever since the
agricultural revolution some 10,000 years ago. In fact, it may date from even
earlier; in the period of intensive hunting and food gathering preceding the
advent of agriculture, men may have contributed to a dramatic reduction in the
number of species of large mammals inhabiting the earth. (1972 p. 16)
They
went on to list examples of ancient environmental degradation including the
desertification of the Tigress and Euphrates Valleys beginning around 2000 BCE,
deforestation by prehistoric peoples (including hunter gatherers), and the
impact of pastoral peoples in North America through overgrazing. Ehrlich and
Holdren argued that in most of these examples population had played an
important part. It is interesting to note that in his response Commoner did not
address any of these points.
While
their disagreements were stark, what Ehrlich and Holdren’s approach and that of
Commoner share is a scientific analysis of the issue, and an attempt to
understand the dynamics of technological and economic change and its
relationship to environmental degradation. While it was clear that these
‘material’ factors where the immediate cause of environmental degradation, some
argued that origin of the ecological crisis itself lay deep in the philosophical
orientation toward nature at the core of western civilisation.
In
1962 Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring (1962) not only alerted the public to the
catastrophic consequences of pollution as a side-effect of scientific and
technical ‘progress’, but also warned of the inherent danger of the view “that
nature exists for the convenience of man” (p. 297). However it was Lyne White
Jnr’s The Historical Roots of Our
Ecologic Crisis (1967)
that brought the concept of anthropocentrism to the attention of the emerging
environmental movement. White argued: “what people do about their ecology
depends upon what they think about themselves in relation to things around
them” (p. 1205). For White, while the enormous power over nature of science and
technology was the proximate cause of environmental degradation, science and
technology themselves were the product of the Judeo-Christian tradition which
placed human beings firmly at the centre of both the moral and natural world.
According to White, the pagan animism that Christianity replaced regulated the
interchange between human beings and nature and limited negative human impacts:
Before
one cut a tree, mined a mountain, or dammed a brook, it was important to
placate the spirit in charge of that particular situation, and to keep it
placated. By destroying pagan animism, Christianity made it possible to exploit
nature in a mood of indifference to the feelings of natural objects. (ibid.)
White’s
thesis met a number of criticisms, the most important of which pointed out that
his interpretation of the Judeo-Christian tradition was very narrow and lacked
an account of the notion of stewardship present in biblical discourses (see
Passmore 1974/1980). In the second edition of Man’s Responsibility for Nature (1980) John Passmore was doubtful that
attitudinal change would have the impact that many environmental writers have
supposed (for examples see: Callicott, 1989, 1994, 2012; Callicott and Ames,
1989; Naess (1973); Devall and Sessions (1985); Berry (1988, 1993, 1999);
Oelschlaeger (1991); Crist and Kopnina (2014); Washington et al (2017)).
In
contrast to Passmore’s scepticism regarding a change in values, in a recent
UNESCO interview environmental philosopher J. Baird Callicott has argued:
As a
philosopher, I am committed to the belief that all our actions are situated in
and framed by a worldview… In the last analysis, the only way to protect the
environment or make sustainable use of natural resources is an essentially
philosophical revolution, a shift in our ideas of Nature, of human nature, and
the relationship between humans and Nature, naturally accompanied by a shift in
our values from a narrow anthropocentrism to a wider circle of concern. (2012,
p2)
A
connection between ecocentrism, or at least the absence of anthropocentrism, is
common to almost all of those who subscribe to the idea that a change in values
is essential to diverting humanity from ecological catastrophe. The
identification of primal peoples or small scale preindustrial peoples with
ecocentrism and environmental sustainability is also common. For thinkers who
follow White’s general thesis, the values and lifestyles of preindustrial, and
especially primal peoples, represent the gold standard in low environmental
impact. But what evidence is there to support this? Do societies who have
non-anthropocentric values always have a sustainable relationship with nature?
Ehrlich
and Holdren had not been the first to point out that significant ecological
degradation predated the industrial era. Tuan Yi Fu (1968) was one of the
earliest writers to cast doubt on the connection between anthropocentric
attitudes and environmental impact by pointing to the considerable
deforestation undertaken in European pagan antiquity and in Confucian classical
China.
Evidence
from anthropological and archeological sources also casts doubt on the idea
that non-anthropocentric orientations make any real difference to ecological
outcomes. In the anthropological literature for instance, there is little to
support the idea that hunter-gatherer societies practice any kind of
conservation (see Smith and Wishnie, 2000; Hames, 2007). Rambo’s (1985) study
of the Semang Orang Asli people of Peninsular Malaysia showed that at the local
level air pollution from fires, pollution of water and soil was not
quantitatively less significant than industrial society. While no equivalence
can be drawn between the environmental impact of modern society and that of the
Semang, Rambo argued that most of the impacts are qualitatively comparable. He
concluded that it is not a fundamental difference in orientation to nature that
limits the Semang’s impact but the limited size and power of their social
system.
Krech’s
(1999) highly respected examination of the ecological practices of Native
Americans – possibly the most celebrated bearers of an ecocentric sensibility –
shows that contrary to conserving many of the species on which they relied, in
many instances they decimated them. Indeed many Native American beliefs may
have actually militated against conservation since the idea of reincarnation of
animal spirits promoted a belief in fecundity without limits – a conception of
limitlessness not dissimilar to those in anthropocentric western discourses.
Furthermore,
a wealth of archaeological evidence also attests to the frequently not
inconsiderable impact of pre-industrial and often pre-agricultural human beings
on every continent. In particular, the migration of people to regions that had
been previously uninhabited resulted in species extinctions and or ecological
disruption (see Martin 1967; Johnson et al., 2013; Araujo et al., 2017; Worthy
and Holdaway, 2002; Perry et al., 2014; Bahn and Flenley, 1992; Flenley and
Bahn, 2003; Diamond 2005; Middleton, 2012).
Despite
the extensive evidence against it, more than five decades on from White’s article,
the idea that “what people do about their ecology depends upon what they think
about themselves in relation to things around them” (op. cit. p. 1205) has lost
none of its attraction. Part of its appeal lies in our everyday intuition that
values and actions are connected in a straightforward and consistent way.
Responding to the evidence of anthropogenic Quaternary extinctions and Tuan’s
(op. cit.) observations regarding ancient Asian environmental impact Callicott
asks:
Do
our natural (and social) attitudes and values direct our behavior or, on the
contrary, are they a sort of muzak of the mind[?]… Behavior does not flow
exclusively from attitudes and values; but neither are attitudes and values
simply irrelevant to what people do and how they live (Callicott and Ames, 1989
p. 285).
His
last observation is undoubtedly true, but it does somewhat appear to assume
that behaviour must be consistent with all the attitudes and values held by agents
and that all these attitudes and values are consistent and compatible. Yet from
a sociological perspective there are good reasons to believe that this is a
simplistic conception of the agent.
While
there is insufficient space to explore the sociological concept of agency and
the self in any depth here, Anthony Giddens’ (1979, 1984, 1993) stratification
model of the agent might prove a good starting point. The details of this model
are not important to us here except to note that it attempts to analyse the
motivational sources of action in terms of layers of consciousness, moving from
the unconscious, through to practical consciousness (the tacitly held knowledge
of everyday life) and discursive consciousness (being able to give reasons for
one’s actions). Giddens notes that although agents are often very knowledgeable
about the conditions under which they act this knowledge is not exhaustive.
Action is always bounded by unacknowledged conditions and unintended
consequences.
Embracing
the idea of layers of consciousness, the concept of the self as a unified and
rationally coherent entity must be at least partially suspended in recognition
that individuals often hold mutually incompatible beliefs and attitudes, and a
hierarchy of desires and wants (see Craib 1992; Stones 2005). A connection
between the incompatibility of one motivation/action and another may never be
reflectively experienced as incompatible and conflicting, and hence no
cognitive dissonance may be experienced.
In
practical terms this means that it is perfectly possible for individuals in any
society to, at some level, hold ecocentric values but nonetheless engage in
practices which contradict these values. The example of ‘bison (or buffalo)
jumps’, found in the North American archaeological record and recorded as late
as the early 19th century (Krech 1999), where hundreds of animals were driven
to their deaths, and where most of the meat was left to rot, may well be an
example of a people holding an ecocentric worldview[1], but being motivated by the immediate
need to provide food by the easiest and most reliable method.[2] The
same conflict of values might also be true of all of the archaeological cases
above, but without hard evidence for the values of the people in question this
can be no more than speculation.
The
postmaterialist demographic identified by Booth in his paper published in this
issue might serve as a contemporary hypothetical illustration of value conflict
and ranking of desires. As Booth shows, there is a strong correlation between
postmaterialist values and concern about the environment. It is clear that some
aspects of postmaterialist lifestyles have a lower environmental impact due to
reduced energy consumption in domestic heating and local transport.
While
this demographic is relatively uninterested in personal possessions they are
interested in travel. However, if our hypothetical postmaterialist subject
enjoys taking-in far flung exotic cultures, landscapes, flora and fauna, their
carbon footprint alone from international flights might well far outweigh all
of their reduced emissions from domestic heating and local travel (see
Berners-Lee 2010 for relative figures). Moreover it’s not just the carbon
footprint of travel that is environmentally problematic: hotel construction,
water usage, erosion and so on all have significant impacts. Our theoretical
postmaterialist subject may well be extremely concerned about climate change,
the destruction of natural habitats, mass extinction and so on, and part of
their motivation for travel might be due to a deep love of nature. It may be
that they never consider their desire to travel and their environmental
concerns together, and if they do they may underestimate the environmental
impact, or perhaps they simply rank the desire to travel higher than their
environmental values. This theoretical speculation might find empirical support
in recent research by Alcock et al. (2017) using UK survey data, which shows
that while there is a strong correlation between environmental concern and
routine pro-environmental behaviour (being energy conscious, using less
packaging, recycling etc), no correlation was found with the propensity to take
flights.
Booth
argues that it may well be that the postmaterialist demographic has a lower birth-rate
than average, which according to Wynes and Nicholas (2017) would have a greater
positive impact than any other action, greatly outweighing the negative impact
of air travel. However, it is unlikely that the choice to have fewer children
would be directly motivated by environmental concerns rather than the result of
other social factors such as female career choices. Thus, the environmental
benefits of this choice would be an unintended consequence of action.
Beyond
attempting to understand possible disjunctions between values and action, we
can say something about the social context and the unintended consequences of
action. Many have commented on the ecological knowledge of indigenous peoples
(for an overview see Inglis 1993). However,
this often extensive knowledge does not preclude the possibility of
unacknowledged conditions of action and the production of unintended
environmental consequences. As we have seen, the archaeological and
anthropological evidence clearly shows that small-scale societies with low
technology can have significant environmental impacts that are the unintended
consequences of their socio-technical practices in everyday life.
Ehrlich
and Holdren’s IPAT identity provides far greater explanatory power for the
environmental impact of a society, whatever its philosophical orientation to
nature might be. Thus, in the case of the Native American use of bison jumps,
although the technique was extremely effective at killing a large number of
animals in one go, Indian populations were simply too small to make a real
difference to buffalo numbers. It took a population influx of Europeans for
whom the buffalo were an impediment to cattle ranching etc., a high demand for
buffalo hides, and new technology in the form of guns and railways to devastate
their numbers.
The
fact that individual agents are themselves participants in social systems
represents another dimension in the ability of any individual to act on all of
their values and attitudes without conflict. The participation in a
social-technical system not only structurally constrains the actions of
individuals by limiting the resources available to them such as their source of
energy, but also in terms of the normal expectations of life. Adam Smith noted
in 1776 that:
A
linen shirt, for example, is, strictly speaking, not a necessary of life. But…
a creditable day-labourer would be ashamed to appear in public without a linen
shirt, the want of which would be supposed to denote that disgraceful degree of
poverty which, it is presumed, nobody can well fall into without extreme bad
conduct. (2007 [1776] p.676)
In
affluent contemporary societies the world-over the range of ‘necessities’ would
extend well beyond decent clothing. Sen (1998) noted that to “live a life
without shame” a range goods and services is necessary, and at the present time
these might include, a mobile ‘phone, broadband, central heating, frequent
showers, eating out, consuming out-of-season produce, eating meat every day,
foreign holidays, and so on. Affluence has not only driven our consumption of
resources in terms of being better able to meet our needs, wants and desires,
but has redefined what is required to properly participate in society – all of
which has increased our environmental footprint. Combine this affluence with
fossil fuel technology and a large population and the environmental problems
are inevitable. As Ehrlich and Holdren showed us, this is not merely a problem
of technology: transitioning to renewable energy technologies might be mitigate
climate change, but, following Commoner (1971), environmentally there’s no such
thing as a free lunch and if issues such as population growth along with a
business-as-usual approach to economic growth remain unaddressed then so too
will other potentially catastrophic ecological problems.
Given
the evidence that attitudes to nature make little difference to actual
environmental impact, it would seem that the replacement of anthropocentrism
with ecocentrism, at least at the level of the individual, would make little
difference to behaviour and hence environmental impact. As participants in
particular societal and technical systems, the environmental consequences of
everyday action are largely out of the conscious control of individuals no
matter what their orientation toward the natural world.
Many
have pointed out that in the weakest sense all values are anthropocentric i.e.
it is only human beings that engage in the act of valuing. Over and above this
very weak sense, is there anything in the discourse of anthropocentrism that is
worth defending or that might have some utility in our attempt to deal with
anthropogenic environmental change? The idea that only human beings have moral
value and are the only objects of moral consideration, contained in the
strongest version of anthropocentrism, is to many people, including myself,
morally objectionable. However, attempts to demonstrate intrinsic value in
nature are not only difficult, but largely entirely unconvincing. In contrast,
weaker versions of anthropocentrism that attempt to avoid speciesism and the
denial of moral standing to abstract entities such as habitats and ecosystems
have been cogently articulated. In these weaker versions of anthropocentrism,
by virtue of a discourse of obligation or through philosophical relationalism,
human beings are seen as the source of value but not the only object of moral
consideration (see Norton 1984; O’Neill 1997; Chan et al. 2016). Those who
advocate these weaker anthropocentric approaches argue that they can
potentially achieve all that ecocentrism aspires to without the complex and
usually laboured attempts to show intrinsic value. However, given the
conclusion that the valuing of the natural world by individuals has made little
difference to actual environmental impact, are these approaches of any
practical use?
While
I have made the case that individual value change is not likely to
significantly alter individual behaviour, at a governmental and international
regulatory level the drafting of policies which are strongly anthropocentric,
as indicated by Ryerson in respect of the Cairo Consensus (see Ryerson’s paper
in this issue), will undoubtedly have outcomes which ignore the balance between
human interests and ecological sustainability. However, the adoption of an
approach which attenuates human-centredness, such as that outlined in the UN
‘Harmony With Nature’ project (again see Ryerson’s paper), may well produce
outcomes which consider the value of the natural world in its own right. The
‘Harmony With Nature’ project clearly owes much more to the approach taken by
weaker anthropocentrist approaches than it does to intrinsic value or
ecocentric perspectives.
Policies
committed to a model of ever-increasing economic and population growth without
consideration of the effects on the biosphere are clearly anthropocentric in
the narrowest and strongest sense. However, it is clear that such
human-centeredness has significant potential to undermine the conditions not
only for human existence but also for flourishing (see Kidner 2014 for a
thought-provoking discussion). It is in the sphere of domestic and
international regulatory policy that a decentering of narrow human interests in
favour of a broader sense of the dependence of humankind on the ecological
diversity of the natural world can have the greatest impact. By changing the
social-structural conditions of everyday life governments and international
agencies can moderate excessive consumption, create conditions for the development
and adoption of sustainable technology, and importantly, enable and encourage
people to make decisions about family size that not only benefit them, but are
also compatible with global ecological sustainability.
Notes
[1] As with all prehistoric peoples the
values and attitudes that they held are unknown and unknowable, we can only
offer speculations based upon the interpretation of artifacts and extrapolation
from what we know from the earliest historical accounts of their distant
descendants – see Hutton 1991 for an account in respect of prehistoric Britain.
[2] Another reading of such events might also
point to the known evidence regarding reincarnation of animal spirits as shown
in Krech’s (1999) study.
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