Environmental Values 9(2000): 3-38. doi: 10.3197/096327100129341958
It has been argued that there is an irreconcilable difference between those advocating animal liberation or animal rights, on the one hand, and those preferring a wider environmental ethic, which includes concern for non-sentient life-forms and species preservation, on the other. In contrast, I argue that it is possible to provide foundations for both seemingly environmentalist positions by exploring some of the potential of a 'collective-projectivist' reading of Hume - one that seems more consistent with Hume's texts than other readings. In short, this article seeks to advance our understanding of some of the possibilities within Humean moral theory, while simultaneously providing new foundations for both animal welfare and a wider environmental ethic.
KEYWORDS: animal rights, intrinsic value, projectivism, secondary qualities, subjectivism, sympathy, welfare
REFERENCES to other articles in Environmental Values:
'Back Together Again' Again. J. Baird Callicott
CITATIONS in other Environmental Values articles:
Non-Humean Holism, Un-Humean Holism Y.S. Lo
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