Environmental Values 18 (2009): 5-32. doi: 10.3197/096327109X404717
After showing that Rolston's and Callicott's value theories are fundamentally flawed, I demonstrate that a value theory grounded in neoclassical, or process, metaphysics avoids the problems in, and incorporates insights from, these accounts. A fundamental thesis of neoclassical metaphysics is that individual creatures at all levels of reality (from non-sensuous, non-conscious to self-conscious) are subjects of experience. Since individuals are subjects, this value theory meets Callicott's legitimate demand that value requires a valuer. And because such subjectivity does not depend on consciousness, this theory meets Rolston's legitimate demand that intrinsic value not depend upon human valuation.
Environmental ethics, moral worth, intrinsic value, metaphysics
REFERENCES to other articles in Environmental Values:
Non-Humean Holism, Un-Humean Holism Y.S. Lo
A Humean Argument for the Land Ethic? Y.S. Lo
Download full text (PDF format) from IngentaConnect. Access is free if your institution subscribes to Environmental Values.
Contact the publishers for subscriptions and back numbers of Environmental Values.Other papers in this volume
THE WHITE HORSE PRESS
The Old Vicarage, Winwick
Cambridgeshire, PE28 5PN, UK
Tel: +44 1832 293222