Environmental Values 17(2008): 15-22. doi: 10.3197/096327108X271923
Bryan Norton argues that my recent critique of anthropocentrism presupposes J. Baird Callicott's philosophically problematic distinction between intrinsic and instrumental value and that the problems that it raises for anthropocentrism in general are in fact only problems for strong anthropocentrism. I argue, first, that my own view does not presuppose Callicott's distinction, nor any claims about instrumental value, and second, that the problems it raises for anthropocentrism apply to weak and strong anthropocentrism alike.
Anthropocentrism, Norton, value, intrinsic, instrumental
REFERENCES to other articles in Environmental Values:
Two Distinctions in Environmental Goodness. Karen Green
Anthropocentrism vs. Nonanthropocentrism: Why Should We Care?.Katie McShane
Convergence, Noninstrumental Value and the Semantics of 'Love': Comment on McShane. Bryan G. Norton
CITATIONS in other Environmental Values articles
Value Typology in Cost-Benefit Analysis. Seth D. Baum
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