Environmental Values 17(2008): 5-14. doi: 10.3197/096327108X271914
Katie McShane, while accepting my 'convergence hypothesis' (the view that anthropocentrists and nonanthropocentrists will tend to propose similar policies), argues that nonanthropocentrism is nevertheless superior because it allows conservationists to have a deeper emotional commitment to natural objects than can anthropocentrists. I question this reasoning on two bases. First, McShane assumes a philosophically tendentious distinction between intrinsic and instrumental value - a distinction that presupposes a dualistic worldview. Second, I question why McShane believes anthropocentrists - weak anthropocentrists, that is - cannot 'love' or 'feel awe' toward natural objects. Her argument, that is, only works against strong anthropocentrism, which I never advocated.
Anthropocentrism, emotions, convergence
REFERENCES to other articles in Environmental Values:
The Pragmatic Power and Promise of Theoretical Environmental Ethics: Forging a New Discourse J. Baird Callicott
Anthropocentrism vs. Nonanthropocentrism: Why Should We Care?.Katie McShane
CITATIONS in other Environmental Values articles
Convergence, Noninstrumental Value and the Semantics of 'Love': Reply to Norton.Katie McShane
Reasons and Values in Environmental Ethics. Lars Samuelsson
Value Typology in Cost-Benefit Analysis. Seth D. Baum
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